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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue presented: Whether the arresting deputy's statement that "if it were 
him he would not submit to the chemical test" unfairly influenced the decision to 
refuse and renders that refusal involuntary. 
Standard of Review: "[W]e review the trial court's conclusions of law under 
a correction-of-error standard." Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 5875 589 
(Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
RELEVANT PORTIONS OF TEXTS OF STATUTES, RULES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part) 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (2006) - located in its entirety at Addendum A 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GENE DECKER, 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case came before the trial court for a trial de novo on an administrative 
appeal from the Driver's License Division on August 31, 2006. R 78. At the trial de 
novo the respondent presented the testimony of the law enforcement officer to meet its 
burden and to justify the arrest for DUI and the subsequent suspension ui un :river's 
license based on a refusal to take the breath test requested by the officer. 
1\ lr. I )ecker urged the trial court to reverse the finding of the administrative agency 
and to reinstate the driver's license of Mr. Decker as the reqi testing officer I iii nself had 
advised Mr. Decker that if it were him, he would not submit to the test. 
The driver's license revocation was upheld by order of the trial court on February 
9,2007 nnilllii^appcil lnll..\^'d K. 58-62. -
L • \l T 
Case No. 20070210-CA 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 21, 2006, Gene Decker was involved in a rollover accident at 
approximately 9500 West and Butterfield Canyon Road. R. 78 at 4. Deputy Steve 
Marshall of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office responded to the dispatch call. R. 78 
at 4-5. Deputy Marshall has been an officer for eleven years and over those eleven years 
has investigated only 20 to 30 DUI cases. R. 78 at 4. On arriving at the scene, the 
deputy observed Gene Decker with a head injury, detected the odor of alcohol from Mr. 
Decker, permitted the EMTs to attend to Mr. Decker, conducted field sobriety tests and 
arrested Mr. Decker for DUI with Injury. R. 78 at 5-12. 
While transporting Mr. Decker from the scene to the Special Operations Division 
of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Deputy Marshall—during that one hour time 
frame—engaged in several conversations with Mr. Decker. R78 at 13-14, 55. Mr. 
Decker was handcuffed at the time and sitting in the front passenger seat of the deputy's 
vehicle. T. 78 at 61. The Deputy testified that during that hour trip he spoke very 
honestly with Mr. Decker regarding all aspects of the situation. R. 78 at 15. Mr. Decker, 
among other things, inquired of the deputy whether he should take the breath test on 
arrival at the station. R. 78 at 13-14, 55. The Deputy testified on direct examination that 
initially he would not respond to Mr. Decker indicating he should not give him answers 
because they could be considered advice. R. 78 at 13. He said Mr. Decker clarified that 
2 
u_ R. 78 ai 13. The Deputy further testified that Mr. Decker told him he would consider 
all of the aspects from the information the Deputy provided to him in making up his own 
iiiini: 1 R 78; H 1 1 
Deputy Marshall testified that he told Mr. Decker, "I, personally, would not 
submit to a chemical test." R. 78 at 14. The Deputy further indicated that he additionally 
discussed whal \uniM hap]nil il'lu: ilidn'l laki tin- test ainl llial hi> opinion was not legal 
advice, just his own personal opinion. R. 78 at 15. on arrival at the station and once 
asked to provide the test, Mr. Decker elected not to take the requested test, R. 78 at 15. 
I\ !i Decker'"'s testin 101 ly ii idicated he relied 100 °A » oi i that opinion iron i the Deputy 
Marshall. R.78 at 69-70. He also testified that he relied on the Deputy's experience and 
knowledge as a police officer to assess whether he should follow his opinion. R 78 at 
70. 
1 he Deputy subsequently read, verbatim the admoi litioi is oi I tl le DI II forn I tc > Mi 
Decker. R. 78 at 16 He also followed up the reading of the admonitions by further 
explaining the options to Mr. Decker in an effort to make sure that that was his decision 
and that he felt tl lat he was r :•. > * . :i d-e;;--• •*• »• 17. 
On cross-examination the Deputy acknowledged that his personal opinion and 
statement "If it were me, I wouldn't take the test," could influence Mr. Decker's decision 
whether to take tl le test R 78 at 57-58 I- le fi irther explaii led 1:1 lat the discussion 
regarding the consequences of taking, or not taking the test, included that taking the test 
3 
was good for law enforcement because it is good for evidentiary purposes. T. 78 at 59-
60. He additional told Mr. Decker that if he didn't take the test "that he would be 
suspended, in all likelihood." T. 78 at 60. 
The trial court signed findings of facts and conclusions of law which stated that 
"Deputy Marshall's statements regarding his personal opinion did not have any legal 
effect on Petitioner's refusal to take the breath test" and that "Petitioner clearly made an 
informed and voluntary decision to not take the breath test." R. 61. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Deputy Marshall's statement that if it was him, he would not take the breath test, 
operated to impermissibly influence Mr. Decker against taking the requested 
chemical/breath test. Mr. Decker's refusal was not voluntary and should not be 
countenanced. The trial court was in error in finding Mr. Decker's refusal to be 
voluntary and in denying his petition to reinstate the driver's license. See Addendum B 
for a copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEPUTY'S STATEMENT TO THE ARRESTEE THAT "IF IT 
WERE HIM HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO THE CHEMICAL TEST" 
RENDERS THE SUBSEQUENT REFUSAL AS INVOLUNTARY 
AND REQUIRES REINSTATEMENT OF THE DRIVER'S LICENSE. 
Utah's implied consent law requires that motorists arrested for DUI must be 
asked * *• lietl it: i tl ley \ /ill si ibi nit to a chemical test for ak -.i* •. . \.J Ann. § 
41-6a-520 (2006). An arresting officer has the duty to properly advise a driver as to his 
rights and the potential consequences with regard to the officer's request that he submit to 
a chei i ileal test. I Jtal i • : 01 n ts must determine A .>-. •. ...• 'he office! pi ovided v\rai i lings '"that 
a person of reasonable intelligence, who is in command of his senses, would 
understand.'" Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1986) (quoting Muir v. Cox, 
2d 3 84, 3 — . ORW f Stewart, J., concurring)). 
The arrestee in a DUI, therefore, has the choice to take the requested test or to 
refuse the test and lose his driver's license privilege for a period of 18 or 24 months. The 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that states may permissibly provide such a choice 
where an accused refuses to take a test lawfully requested b l - officer. »est to 
take a test itself is not coercive. 
We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-
alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the 
criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices. 
See, e.g., Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183. 
213-217,91 S.Ct 1454, 1470-1472. 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). We hold, therefore, 
that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully 
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requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 922-23 (1983). 
Our Utah Supreme Court has noted: 
There is no mysterious meaning to the word 'refusal.' In the context of the 
implied consent law, it simply means that an arrestee, after having been requested 
to take the breathalyzer test, declines to do so of his own volition. Whether the 
declination is accomplished by verbally saying, 'I refuse', or by remaining silent 
and just not breathing or blowing into the machine, or by vocalizing some sort of 
qualified or conditional consent or refusal, does not make any difference. The 
volitional failure to do what is necessary in order that the test can be performed 
is a refusal. 
Clearly the loss of driving privileges is a severe deprivation that may have serious 
consequences for an individual, not the least of which is the possible loss of 
employment. Accordingly, it is important that a law enforcement officer make a 
determination that a motorist has refused to take a test on the basis of conduct 
which clearly indicates a volitional refusal with an understanding of the 
consequences that follow upon a refusal. 
State v. Beck, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979)(emphasis added). While requesting the test is 
not coercive, the manner or circumstances of the request may be coercive. 
In Beck, the Court discussed an Idaho case where the arrestee had been injured 
and was in a dazed state when requested to provide a test. The silence which followed 
the request did not permit a finding of a voluntary refusal to the request to submit to a 
test. Mills v. Swanson, 460 P.2d 704 (Idaho 1969). The Beck Court cautioned: "We 
emphasize however that the question as to what constitutes a refusal to take the test must 
depend on the circumstances." Beck, 597 P.2d at 1339, quoting Mills, 460 P.2d at 706. 
In Beck the arrestee's claim of confusion was rejected and the trial court was reversed 
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because the officer had clearly read the arrestee the admonition twice and the confusion 
came from the arrestee's own misunderstanding and reliance on his misunderstanding of 
the state law from California. Id. 
In a similar case, another Utah arrestee complained that his refusal to submit to the 
test was invalid due to the inherent inconsistencies relating to attorney presence when the 
implied consent warning and the Miranda warning are contemporaneously given. Muir v. 
Cox, 611 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1980). The Muir Court rejected that claim based on the 
fact that this arrestee relied on a previous discussion with an attorney who indicated what 
he should do when asked to consent to a police search. Id. 
In yet another matter, a Utah arrestee contended that, having been read his 
Miranda rights at nearly the same time as having been asked to take a chemical test 
without having the advice of counsel, confused him as to his legal rights which amounted 
to reasonable grounds for refusing the test. The Court disagreed and held that "the 
Miranda warning and the Implied Consent Law are not inconsistent, but cautioned that 
each proposition must be stated fully, clearly and understandably so that the driver 
understands that his affirmative duty to take a chemical test is not obviated by the 
Miranda warning." Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979) The Court also 
instructed that the question of whether the motorist was confused and whether he 
manifested his confusion to the arresting officer is for the trier of fact to determine. Id. at 
1334. The case was remanded to the trial court for such a determination. Id. 
7 
Here, in this case a Bar, however, a different set of circumstances requires this 
Court to analyze, and accept, the claim that an arrestee's refusal requires invalidation. 
Mr. Decker, while not so dazed as to not understand the admonition given by the 
Deputy, was more than confused by the admonition; he was expressly informed by the 
officer that if he (the Deputy) was in the position of the arrestee (Mr. Decker) that he (the 
Deputy) would refuse to take the test requested by law enforcement. While the Deputy, 
then later, did request him to take the test, Mr. Decker refused consistent with the 
explanation the officer had earlier provided. The deputy had explained to Mr. Decker 
while conversing during the hour trip into the station from the arrest site that the tests 
provide evidentiary benefits to law enforcement. R. 78 at 59-60. 
The analysis proposed by Mr. Decker presents an issue of first impression in Utah 
yet receives support from those cases which analyze the critical element of voluntariness 
in other situations. Due process considerations are implicated. Utah Courts have 
consistently held that the right to drive is a valuable right or privilege which cannot be 
taken away without due process. See Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P. 2d 
1302 (Utah 1979); Mabus v. Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272 (Utah.App. 1999). In Holman v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah 1979), the Court stated, "Fairness and due process 
require that a person threatened with the loss of his driver's license should be afforded an 
opportunity to make a choice based on a fair explanation of his rights and duties." 
8 
Additionally, Fifth Amendment/Miranda jurisprudence instructs, like our cases 
cited above, that informed and volitional acts are required to support waivers of the right 
to silence or the right to an attorney. 
"[T]he Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to 
prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person 
asserting the privilege." This coercion requirement comes directly from the 
constitutional language directing that no person "shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5 (emphasis 
added). And as Professor Levy concluded in his history of the privilege, u[t]he 
element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the right 
and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating interrogatories." W. 
Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 328 (1968). 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391, 397 (1976). The Neville Court then made the Fifth Amendment connection to 
the DUI informed consent cases. 
Similarly, Schmerber cautioned that the Fifth Amendment may bar the use of 
testimony obtained when the proffered alternative was to submit to a test so 
painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs, that almost 
inevitably a person would prefer "confession." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n.9. 
Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)(unless compulsion inherent in 
custodial surroundings is dispelled, no statement is truly a product of free choice). 
Neville, 459 U.S. at 563, quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
I 
Notably, our courts also have used the two substantive legal areas to analyze and 
resolve issues of refusal/implied consent jurisprudence. In Utah, to guard against officer 
coercion and assure voluntariness of the refusal, controlling case law—in similar fashion 
to equivocal requests for counsel—requires that an officer is only permitted to clarify the 
9 
request or question from the arrestee. If the officer exceeds the clarification duty, again 
due process considerations are implicated. Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979)( 
When driver manifests to officer that he does not understand his duty under implied 
consent law in light of the Miranda warning, officer has the responsibility to clarify 
driver's rights and responsibilities.).1 
In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990), this Court discussed at 
length the clarification approach to inquiries from a custodial suspect. Within the 
Sampson decision this Court cited with approval an Alaska case that provides insight to 
our situation now at Bar. When Alaska defendant Hampel made an equivocal request for 
counsel, the officer did not clarify the issue. Rather, like our deputy here, he exceeded his 
role and provided information beyond clarification which rendered involuntary and 
unusable the subsequent waiver and admissions of Hampel. The Court discussed the 
issue as follows: 
In the present case, it is clear that the interrogating troopers did not seek merely to 
clarify Hampers requests about obtaining an attorney before pressing on with the 
interrogation. After informing Hampel of his right to an attorney, Lieutenant 
Lucking proceeded to emphasize the obstacles to obtaining one. Lucking then 
expounded at length on the complexities of the criminal justice system, ultimately 
focusing on the evidence incriminating to Hampel. He told Hampel that the gun 
had been found in the car he was driving and that his boots matched tracks found 
1
 In Neville the Court also discussed the fundamental unfairness (or due process rights) of 
implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using 
his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Citing Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). And while the Court concluded no due process violation on 
those facts, the import of entertaining the issue on these comparable legal subjects is both 
noteworthy and supportive here. 
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near Music's body. Lucking's talk was purportedly intended to assist Hampel in 
deciding whether to exercise his fifth amendment rights (emphasis added): 
Lucking: ... I'm trying to give you as much information as I can so that you 
can make an intelligent decision as to what you have to do. There's a lot of 
evidence against you. A lot of evidence against you and what I'm trying to 
stop now is probably be tomorrow and subsequent and it's time and that's 
okay. 
But the obvious effect of the discourse was to emphasize that Hampel would 
damage his case if he delayed talking until an attorney could be present. Lucking 
further told Hampel that an attorney probably could not be obtained until the next 
day and his friends were being interviewed that night: 
We recognize that Lucking's statements were made in response to direct questions 
posed by Hampel (emphasis added), and we think it appropriate to emphasize that 
nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest that the police should feel 
constrained in responding to questions posed by the accused in the course of an 
interrogation. We further emphasize that, where the accused asks a question that 
contains an ambiguous or equivocal reference to the availability of counsel, an 
interrogating officer must be given considerable latitude in formulating a 
reasonable and responsive answer; in gauging the reasonableness of a specific 
answer, due regard must be given to the pressures under which it was formulated, 
and full account must be taken of the understandable limitations on the scope of 
legal expertise that can reasonably be expected under the circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the need to avoid any undue influence or coercive effect on the 
accused's right to request the presence of counsel during an interrogation makes it 
imperative that certain limits be placed on the manner in which ambiguous or 
equivocal questions concerning the availability of counsel may be answered. We 
believe those limits are exceeded when an interrogating officer chooses to answer 
a question in a way which the officer knows or should know will be reasonably 
likely to discourage the accused from asserting the right to counsel.— 
FN7. We emphasize that the standard we adopt is an objective one, and 
does not depend on the subjective intent of the interrogating officer. Cf 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 
(19801 cert, denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S.Ct. 1980, 72 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982^ 1 
(adopting an analogous standard for determining whether "interrogation" 
has occurred). It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether, in this case, 
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Lieutenant Lucking actually intended to discourage Hampel from 
requesting an attorney, and we express no view on the question. We further 
believe it important to draw a distinction between the manner in which an 
interrogating officer chooses to formulate a response and the substance of 
the response itself. Nothing in our opinion is intended to suggest that an 
interrogating officer would commit any impropriety or otherwise be 
precluded from answering a question by the accused directly calling for a 
response containing substantive information likely to discourage exercise of 
the right to counsel. We deal in this case only with the manner in which a 
response is articulated and, to that extent, with substantive information 
included in the response which is not directly called for by the accused's 
questions. We believe it clear from the record that, in this case, Hampel's 
questions did not reasonably call for a speculative elaboration of the 
potential difficulties that might be faced in attempting to obtain counsel; 
nor do the questions seek to elicit a detailed review dealing with the timing 
and progress of the investigation. 
Statev, Hampel, 706 P.2d 1173, 11 -1181 (Alaska 1985).2 The Alaska court cited to 
other state and federal decisions supporting its conclusions. Id. at 1182. At end, the 
Alaska court found the lower court's decision to accept the waiver was in error as not 
voluntarily given. Id. at 1181. Mr. Decker's situation is substantially similar to that of 
Hample. While the obvious odd difference exists that the deputy here urged refusal, an 
atypical law enforcement position, the result was the same. Mr. Decker relied 100% on 
the deputy's experienced and knowledgeable statement and he refused the test, losing an 
important possession of the driver's license. The Hampel statements were ruled 
involuntary; this Court should similarly find that Mr. Decker's refusal was not voluntarily 
provided and order the district court to reinstate his driver's license. 
2
 Appellant apologizes for the lengthy citation but insists the comparison is uncanny and 
helpful to the analysis of the issue presented. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
Because the deputy inappropriately influenced Mr. Decker's decision, failing in 
his obligation to only clarify the request and opting instead to tell him what he would do 
in the situation, this Court should find Mr. Decker's refusal to be improperly given. 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the district court 
order denying Mr. Decker's requested relief to reinstate the driver's license and remand 
with an order for the lower court to do just that 
DATED this,?*? day of June, 2007. 
JASON A. SCHATZ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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§ 41-6a-520. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug-Number of 
tests-Refusal-Warning, report 
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given 
the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, urine, 
or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the person was operating or 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while: 
(i) having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6a-502, 41-6a-530, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; 
(ii) under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug under Section 41-6a-502; or 
(iii) having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6a-517. 
(b) A test or tests authorized under this Subsection (1) must be administered at the 
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have been 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while in violation of any 
provision under Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (iii). 
(c)(i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how 
many of them are administered. 
(ii) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or 
more requested tests, even though the person does submit to any other requested 
test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(d)(i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical 
test or tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids may not select the 
test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical 
test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a 
defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a 
person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests. 
(2)(a) A peace officer requesting a test or tests shall warn a person that refusal to 
submit to the test or tests may result in revocation of the person's license to operate 
a motor vehicle , a five or ten-year prohibition of driving with any measurable or 
detectable amount of alcohol in the person's body depending on the person's prior 
driving history, and a three-year prohibition of driving without an ignition 
interlock device if the person: 
(i) has been placed under arrest; 
(ii) has then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the 
chemical tests under Subsection (1); and 
(iii) refuses to submit to any chemical test requested. 
(b)(i) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License Division and 
within 24 hours of the arrest, give notice of the Driver License Division's intention 
to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle, 
(ii) When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of the Driver License 
Division, the peace officer shall: 
(A) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(B) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of 
arrest; and 
(C) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License 
Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by 
the Driver License Division, also serve as the temporary license certificate. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within 
ten calendar days after the day on which notice is provided under Subsection 
(2)(b), that: 
(i) the peace officer had grounds to believe the arrested person was in violation of 
any provision under Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (iii); and 
(ii) the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection 
(i). 
(3) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests 
shall be made available to the person. 
(4)(a) The person to be tested may, at the person's own expense, have a physician 
of the person's own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility 
of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or 
preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(5) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, 
the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an 
attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the taking of any 
test. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GENE DECKER, : FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
Petitioner, : ORDER 
vs. : 
NANNETTE ROLFE, Bureau Chief : 
Driver Control Bureau, Driver License 
Division, Department of Public Safety, Case No. 060911537 AA 
State of Utah, 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for a trial de novo on August 31, 2006, 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The Petitioner and his counsel Jason Schatz 
appeared. Respondent appeared through counsel Rebecca D. Waldron, Assistant Attorney 
General. The Court, having heard and considered the evidence, stipulations of the parties and 
arguments presented at the hearing, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
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Deputy Clerk 
appearing, enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 21, 2006, Petitioner was involved in a accident in Butterfield Canyon. 
Deputy Marshall arrived at the location of the accident. Petitioner admitted to being the driver of 
the vehicle. Deputy Marshall noticed an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the truck 
and the Petitioner. Petitioner admitted to drinking and driving, and stated to Officer Marshall, "I 
had four beers and I screwed up. I'm just glad I didn't kill my nephew Calvin." Petitioner 
admitted to consuming four beers. 
2. Deputy Marshall also noticed that Petitioner's speech was slow and his balance was 
poor. There was no evidence of any head injuries. 
3. Deputy Marshall had Petitioner perform some field sobriety tests. Deputy Marshal 
noticed the on set of nystagmus at about 40 degrees and that Petitioner's eyes lacked smooth 
pursuit. The result of this test was severely compromised because of Deputy Marshall's failure to 
conduct the test as trained. During the one leg stand test, Petitioner only counted to two and then 
dropped his leg to the ground. During the walk and turn test, Petitioner didn't walk straight, he 
did not touch heal to toe, he stopped the test at step eight and said he could not do the test. 
4. Deputy Marshall placed Petitioner under arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol and transported him to special operations which took about OXIQ hour. 
5. During the drive Petitioner engaged Deputy Marshall in a conversation in regards to 
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whether or not he should take the breath test. Deputy Marshal told Petitioner that he could not 
advise him on whether or not he should take a breath test. Deputy Marshall told Petitioner that 
personally he would not take the test. Deputy Marshall however, explained to Petitioner the 
consequences if he refused to take the test numerous times. 
6. Once at Special Operations, Deputy Marshall read Petitioner the chemical test 
admonitions off of the DUI report form, requested that Petitioner take a breath test, and informed 
Petitioner of the consequences of a test result that shows that Petitioner has an unlawful amount 
of alcohol, drug or controlled substance in his body. Petitioner responded, "Well, I took no drugs 
and I refuse the test." 
7. Deputy Marshall then read Petitioner the refusal admonition, which informed 
Petitioner that if he refuses the breath test his driving privilege may be revoked for 18 months for 
a first refusal or 24 months if it is a second or subsequent license withdrawal for an alcohol or 
drug related driving offense, with no provision for limited driving. Petitioner refused to take the 
breath test. 
8. Petitioner was served with a copy of the Driver License Division's notice of intent to 
suspend or revoke his license. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
1. Deputy Marshall had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for driving under the 
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influence of alcohol. Even if all of the Field sobriety Tests are thrown out there is enough for 
probable cause. Petitioner was in an vehicle accident, and he consumed for beers. Petitioner 
admitted that "I'm screwed up." Petitioner's speech was slow, and his balance was poor. The 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test was severely compromised. However, the results of the walk 
and turn just helps establish probable cause. Failure to say if you put your foot down pick it back 
up, does not change the fact that Petitioner could only keep his foot raised for 2 counts. 
Petitioner then stated that he could not do the test. Failure to measure the inches that Petitioner 
missed heel to toe does not effect the fact that Petitioner didn't finish the tests and stated that he 
could not do that test. 
2. Petitioner refuse the requested breath test after being informed of the consequences of 
the refusal. Deputy Marshall properly read Petitioner the admonitions, then he went above and 
beyond in his explanations of the consequences included in the admonitions. Deputy Marshall's 
statements regarding his personal opinion did not have any legal effect on Petitioner's refusal to 
take the breath test. The pivotal fact in this case is that while Deputy Marshall may have voice 
certain personal opinions about taking the breath test himself, he also emphasized the 
consequences to the Petitioner if he refused to take the test. Based on the testimony presented at 
trial, Petitioner clearly made an informed and voluntary decision to not take the breath test. 
3. Petitioner was served with notice of the Driver License Division's intent to suspend or 
revoke his license. 
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ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1 Petitioner's Petition is denied. 
2. The revocation of Petitioner's driving privilege is upheld 
Dated this day of 
Approved as to 
/ /MMm 
Jason Schatz 7 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge ^
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